On November 29, 1996, 7-week old Etzel Smith's mother, Tomeka, put Etzel to sleep on a sofa before going to sleep herself in another room. Etzel's grandmother, defendant in this case, slept on the floor next to Etzel. several hours later, defendant ran into Tomeka's room, holding Etzal, who was limp, and told her that something was wrong with Etzel. By the time emergency officials arrived, Etzel was not breathing and had no heartbeat. Smith reported that she thought Etzel had fallen off the sofa. The official's efforts to resuscitate Etzel failed.
Doctors initially attributed Etzel's death to SIDS. After an autopsy, the coroner concluded that the cause of death was instead shaken baby syndrome (SBS). When a social worked informed defendant of that finding, she told her that Etzel had not responded to her touch while sleeping, so she had picked him up and given him "a little shake, a jostle" to wake him. Defendant was arrested and charged with assault on a child resulting in death.
At trial, the medical examiner for the Los Angeles County Coroner testified that Etzel's autopsy revealed recent hemorrhages in the brain, and he opined that the bleeding and other features of her pathology, including a bruise and abrasion on the lower back of the baby's head, were consistent with violent shaking. The deputy medical examiner also testified, and agreed.
The defense called two experts to dispute these conclusions. The first testified that Etzel died from brain trauma, but that it was not the result of SBS given the lack of retinal hemorrhaging. The other defense expert testified that Etzel's death was indeed due to SIDS.
The jury found defendant guilty. The trial judge denied her motion for a new trial and sentenced her to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison.
On direct review, defendant contended that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that Etzel died from SBS. After thoroughly reviewing the competing medical testimony, the California Court of Appeal rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court denied review.
Defendant then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Central District of California, renewing her claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Etzel died of SBS. The magistrate judge nevertheless concluded that the evidence was clearly sufficient to support a conviction, and the District Court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed with instructions to grant the writ. Despite the plentitude of expert testimony in the trial record, the Ninth Circuit determined that there was "no evidence to permit an expert conclusion one way or the other" on the cause of Etzel's death, because there was "no physical evidence of tearing or shearing, and no other evidence supporting death by violent shaking."
That conclusion was plainly wrong. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction so long as "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." A reviewing court "faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume -- even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record -- that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution."
The Ninth Circuit's assertion that the experts "reached their conclusion because there was no evidence in the brain itself of the cause of death" is simply false. There was "evidence in the brain ietself." The autopsy revealed indications of recent trauma to Etzel's brain, such as subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhaging, hemorrhaging around the optic nerves, and the presence of a blood clot between the brain's hemisphere. The autopsy also revealed a bruise and abrasion on thelower back of Etzel's head. These affirmative indications of trauma formed the basis of the experts' opinion that Etzel died from shaking so severe that his brainstem tore.
Doubts about whether defendant is in fact guilty are understandable. But it is not the job of this Court, and was not that of the Ninth Circuit, to decide whether the State's theory was correct. The jury decided that question, and its decision is supported by the record.
The decision below cannot be allowed to stand. This Court vacated and remanded this judgment twice before, calling the panel's attention to this Court's opinions high-lighting the necessity of deference to stat courts in §2254(d) habeas cases. each time the panel persisted in its course, reinstating its judgment without seriously confronting the significance of the cases called to its attention. It's refusal to do so necessitates this Court's action today.
The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
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