Doe explained to the trial court that she was just three months shy of her eighteenth birthday, that she was a high school senior with average grades, that she planned to attend college, and that she aspired to be a lawyer. She testified that she had been examined by a physician who confirmed her pregnancy, who explained the abortion process, and also told her about the risks and complications associated with abortions. She told the Court that although she was aware that there were agencies that could assist her, she would not be able to provide adequate care for her child, if carried to term, because she was unemployed and, also, because she intended to attend college in the fall.
Doe also testified that she had not told her mother about her pregnancy or her planned abortion, because she feared that her mother would "throw her out" if she did. When the trial court asked her about adoption, she agreed that it was an alternative, but stated that she was not "physically, mentally, or emotionally ready for this baby."
The trial court denied Doe's application. The Court reasoned that Doe was not sufficiently mature and capable to consent to an abortion because (1) she had not told her mother of her intentions, and (2) the abortion provider had only provided her with written materials about the procedure that day - technically complying with the legal requirements, but placing Doe in a position where she had to reevaluate her previous decision while in court.
Doe appealed, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. Doe successfully filed for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
The Supreme Court noted that this was a question of first impression. As an initial matter, it held that. . .
. . . an appellate court reviewing a denial of a petition for judicial authorization for an abortion should give deference to the facts found by the lower court where they are supported by competent evidence of record; review pure questions of law under the de novo standard of review without affording deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions, and review under an abuse of discretion standard the trial court’s ultimate determination as to whether the minor is mature and capable of giving informed consent to an abortion.The Court then went on to conclude that:
The Act states with unmistakable clarity that in order for a physician to legally perform an abortion on a minor, the minor must obtain the consent of one parent or, alternatively, obtain judicial authorization. Id. § 3206(a), (c). Neither parental consultation nor consent is required if the minor is seeking judicial authorization for an abortion, as the Act expressly permits the minor to elect not to seek the consent of her parents. Indeed, the purpose of a judicial bypass proceeding is to determine whether the minor possesses the maturity/capacity to give independent informed consent, as every minor who seeks judicial authorization for an abortion does so because she lacks or elects not to seek parental consent. Thus, a minor’s failure to consult with or obtain the consent of her parent cannot serve as the basis for denying a petition for judicial authorization.On this basis, the Court vacated the decision of the Superior Court. Because Doe was no longer pregnant, and the issue was technically moot, the Court declined to vacate the decision of the trial court.